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ABSTRACT In developing countries and in particular in sub-Saharan Africa, social protection schemes tend to operate
in silos. However, schemes targeting the same geographical areas may have synergies that have not yet been examined,
and which are worth scrutinising. This paper contributes to this knowledge gap by examining the joint impacts of two
social protection programmes in Ethiopia, that is, the Productive Safety Net Programme and aCommunity BasedHealth
Insurance Scheme. Based on three rounds of individual level panel data and several rounds of qualitative interviews, we
find that individuals covered by both programmes, as opposed to neither or only one of the two programmes, provide
greater labour supply, have larger livestock holdings, and have a lower amount of outstanding loans. Furthermore, joint
participation is associated with greater use of modern health care facilities as compared to participating only in the
safety net programme. These results show that bundling of interventions enhances protection against multiple risks and
that linking social protection schemes yields more than the sum of their individual effects.
1. Introduction
As in other developing countries, rural Ethiopian households are exposed to a variety of natural, economic,
and health risks (Yilma et al., 2014). Continued dependence on rain-fed agriculture as the main livelihood
source (Di Falco, Veronesi, & Yesuf, 2011; Tilahun, Teklu, Michael, Fistsum, & Awulachew, 2011),
coupled with the lack of well-developed credit and insurancemarkets, intensifies the effects of these risks.
For instance, in the absence of health insurance, exposure to a health shock may lead to borrowing and
selling of assets and reinforce existing poverty and, in turn, harm the ability of households to cope with
non-health related risks. This paper is motivated by the potential interplay and mutually reinforcing
negative effects of different types of shocks, which suggests that effective protection may require the
simultaneous implementation of multiple social protection interventions.
There is a large literature that has examined the effect of specific social protection instruments. For
instance, in the context of low andmiddle income countries a number of papers have demonstrated the effect
of cash transfer programmes on food consumption, health and educational outcomes (Behrman&Hoddinott,
2005; Burchi, Scarlato, & D’Agostino, 2016; Hidrobo, Hoddinott, Kumar, & Olivier, 2018), the effect of
public works programmes on asset-building, climatic risks and food security (Anderson, Mekonnen, &
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Stage, 2011; Gilligan, Hoddinott, & Taffesse, 2009), and the effect of health insurance schemes on health
care utilisation and financial protection on the one hand (Mebratie et al., 2013; Pagán, Puig, & Soldo, 2007;
Strupat & Klohn, 2018) and on borrowing and assets sales on the other (Yilma et al., 2015).
Despite this large body of work, studies which have examined the interlinkages and the joint effects of
participating in different social protection programmes on welfare outcomes, are scarce. In contrast, there is
a comparatively well-developed literature which has examined the interlinkages between agricultural
interventions and social protection programmes, although papers on Africa even in this literature are
limited.1 For instance, Pace et al. (2017) use difference-in-difference (DiD) with propensity score matching
to analyse the joint effect of Malawi’s Farm Input Subsidy Program (FISP) and Social Cash Transfer
Program (SCTP), which target poor and ultra-poor households, on household expenditure and production.
Despite the lack of explicit coordination between the two programmes, the authors find that the joint effect of
participating in both programmes increases total expenditure per adult equivalent by 24 per cent as compared
to the baseline mean for households who participate in both the programmes and the value of production
increases by at least 70 per cent of the baseline mean. Daidone et al. (2017) also use a DiD approach to
examine the joint effect of a homestead gardening programmewhich targeted households whowere eligible
for a child grants programme. They conclude that the positive effects of the programmes on productive
agricultural activities may be attributed to the joint effect of the two schemes. Turning to Ethiopia, in an
evaluation that relied on propensity score matching, Gilligan et al. (2009) examined the joint effects of the
Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP) and an agricultural intervention – Other Food Security
Programme (OFSP) – and found that, among other effects, access to both programmes enhanced food
security and increased the use of agricultural technologies. However, access to both programmes did not lead
to faster asset growth as compared to households that did not have access to either of the programmes. In
a related paper, Hoddinott, Berhane, Gilligan, Kumar, and Taffesse (2012) used a dose response model to
investigate the joint effect of being a beneficiary of both the PSNPand theOFSP as compared to participation
only in the PSNP. They find that participation in both programmes tends to enhance agricultural investments.
Closest to the theme of this paper which deals with the joint effects of social protection programmes,
Jensen, Barrett, and Mude (2017) examine the comparative individual effects as well as explore the joint
impacts of a cash transfer programme and a livestock insurance scheme in Northern Kenya. They find no
evidence of positive synergies and attribute this to the minor overlap in coverage between the two
programmes. In the Ethiopian context, Berhane, Hoddinott, and Kumar (2014) examine the effect of the
Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP) and the community-based nutrition (CBN) programme in
localities where both schemes are operating. Their investigation reveals that there are no joint effects on
various indicators of child nutrition. However, they also point out that the two schemes are ‘loosely meshed’
and are co-located but not linked programmatically. While our paper also focuses on Ethiopia, there are
differences in terms of the scheme interactions that we explore as well as the context.2
Motivated by the findings that PSNP participants are substantially more likely to enrol in a Community
Based Health Insurance (CBHI) scheme (Shigute et al., 2017), and by the limited research on the impacts of
multiple social interventions, this paper examines the interplay between the CBHI and PSNP. In particular,
the paper investigateswhether participating in both theCBHI and the PSNPprovides additional protection to
households as compared to participating in none of the schemes or as compared to participating in only one of
the schemes. Consistentwith themotivation for launching theCBHI and PSNP,we focus on the effects of the
schemes on modern health care utilisation, off-farm labour supply, livestock assets, loan uptake, and the
value of outstanding loans.3
The paper relies on three rounds of individual panel data. The first edition of the data was collected in
2011, that is, before the launch of theCBHI, and subsequent roundswere collected in 2012 and 2013.We also
draw on qualitative information collected through key informant interview and focus group discussions
conducted in 2012, 2014, and 2017. Our analysis of both sources of information yields a consistent picture.
We find that both programmes complement each other and generate synergies. Individuals covered by
both programmes, as opposed to neither of the two programmes, provide more off-farm labour, have higher
livestock wealth and have a lower amount of outstanding loans. Furthermore, joint participation as opposed
to participating only in the PSNP is associated with greater use of modern health care facilities. Thus, our
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results indicate that the co-ordination of a public works and a health insurance scheme affords greater
protection to vulnerable households.
The paper unfolds by providing in the next section a brief description of the two programmes. Section 3
discusses the data while Section 4 outlines an analytical and an empirical framework. Section 5 discusses the
findings while Section 6 contains concluding observations.
2. A brief overview of the PSNP and the CBHI
2.1. The Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP)
Before 2005, efforts to enhance food security and deal with natural disasters were based on providing
emergency assistance (MoARD, 2009a). With the objective of relieving households from dependence on
emergency assistance, the government, in collaboration with donor agencies, designed the PSNP. The PSNP
attempts to shift the trend frommeeting short-term food needs to addressing the root causes of food insecurity
by building durable community assets – mainly natural resource management projects designed to reduce
soil erosion, control floods, and harvest and conserve water (MoARD, 2009b, 2010).
The programme focuses on food insecure households residing in food insecure areas. Participation is not
voluntary but is based on a combination of geographical and community-based targeting. At the first stage,
government officials identify food insecure districts based on previous food aid allocation data. Within
districts, local administrators identify chronically food insecure villages and allocate the PSNP resources
within these villages. Household-level targeting is based on selecting households who have received
emergency aid in the past and on other criteria such as assets, income from non-agricultural activities, and
from alternative sources of employment. However, communities have discretion tomodify this approach and
to annually update their lists of food-insecure households based on local conditions.
The programme differentiates between two types of beneficiaries – direct support and public works – and
offers support in cash or in kind to eligible households with no able-bodied members while public works
beneficiaries receive payments based on their labour contributions.4 In the short-run, the programme expects
to enhance food security bymeeting the immediate needs of food insecure households and in themedium- to
longer-run by preventing sales of productive assets and promoting sustainable livelihoods through the
construction of rural infrastructure.
Unlike previous food security efforts, a key objective of the PSNP in its current design is to integrate
existing and future development interventions. As stated in the Programme Implementation Manual
(MoARD, 2010, p. 6), ‘The PSNP is not a project but a key element of local development planning.’ This
approach has been re-emphasised in the most recent PSNP design document (MoA, 2014, p. 3), which aims
to ensure that
poor and vulnerable households benefit from an essential suite of services including safety net transfers,
livelihood interventions, key health and nutrition services, community assets constructed through
public works and support to households up to, during and beyond safety net graduation to ensure that
the improvements they have achieved are sustainable.
2.2. Community Based Health Insurance (CBHI)
Over the past decade, Ethiopia has invested heavily in its rural health infrastructure and recorded progress in
a number of population health outcomes (Mebratie, Sparrow, Yilma, Alemu, & Bedi, 2015). For instance,
child mortality per 1,000 live births has fallen from 166 in 2000 to 88 in 2011 and maternal mortality rates
have declined from 871 to 676 per 100,000 live births (Mebratie et al., 2015). Despite these improvements
and investments in infrastructure, as is evident from the figures, challenges remain. For instance, overall
utilisation rates remain low.According to the EthiopianDemographic andHealth Survey, in 2011, annual per
capita outpatient health care utilisationwas about 0.3 visits. This lowutilisation rate is accompanied by a high
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reliance on out-of-pocket (OOP) payments to finance health care.5 In particular,Yilma et al. (2014) show that
households finance health care, in decreasing order of importance, by dissaving, asset sales, and borrowing.6
In response to this situation, in June 2011, in an attempt to enhance access to health care and help defray
costs while at the same time prevent the use of harmful coping strategies, the government launched
a voluntary CBHI. The pilot scheme was launched in 13 districts, of which nine were classified as food
insecure and were covered by the PSNP.7 The CBHI scheme covers outpatient and inpatient health care
services in public health facilities and does not cover treatment with largely cosmetic value. Monthly
contributions for core household members (parents and minor children) vary between Birr 10.50 (US$
0.56) and Birr 15 (US$0.80) per month with an additional monthly premium of 2.10 to 3 Birr per non-core
household members. Average monthly premiums amount to about 0.5 per cent of household monthly
income. There are no co-payments or deductibles.
While the scheme is government driven, the community is engaged in scheme management and super-
vision. The rollout phase involved a two-step process. First, the community decides whether to participate in
the scheme and subsequently households choose whether to enrol or not. Based on our survey data, in 2013,
almost 51 per cent of individuals in the pilot districts had enrolled in the scheme.
3. Data
The paper is based on three rounds of panel data. The first round was collected inMarch–April 2011, that is,
a few months before the launch of the CBHI, while subsequent rounds were collected in March–April 2012
and March–April 2013. Data collection followed a stratified sampling design and the survey was fielded in
16 districts located in four main regions of the country (Amhara, Oromia, Tigray, and SNNPR).Within each
district, six villageswere randomly selected andwithin each village, 17 householdswere randomly surveyed,
yielding a total sample of 1,632 households. The follow-up survey in 2012 revisited 1,599 households and
the 2013 edition covered 1,583 households (3% attrition). The analysis reported in the paper focuses on
working-age adults (aged 15 to 65) and is based on an unbalanced panel of 12,820 observations.8
In each region, the survey covered three CBHI pilot districts and one non-pilot district. The non-pilot
districts were chosen based on the same criteria used to select the pilot districts. Of the 16 districts, there are
nine districts where both the CBHI and the PSNP operate, three where the CBHI operates but not the PSNP
and four where the PSNP operates but the CBHI was not offered (see Table A1, in the Appendix). The
questionnaire included questions on PSNP and CBHI membership, modules on individual and household
socio-economic characteristics and demographics, assets, employment, consumption expenditure, health
and health care use, access to credit, social networks, and shocks.
We also collected three rounds of qualitative information through key informant interviews and focus
group discussions (FGDs). These were conducted in 2012, 2014, and in 2017. Among other topics, these
interviews and discussions focused on factors that determine participation in the CBHI and the experience of
officials and FGD participants with the two interventions.
4. Analytical framework and empirical approach
4.1. Analytical framework
Our objective is to examine whether participating in both the CBHI and the PSNP provides additional
protection to households as compared to participating in only one of the schemes or as compared to not
participating in any of the schemes. Potentially, the two schemesmay have an effect on a variety of outcomes,
and based on the main channels through which they are expected to operate, this section outlines and
motivates the key outcomes that are the focus of this paper.
The main aim of the CBHI is to enhance access to health care use and to protect households against the
costs of financing health care. As shown in Yilma et al. (2014), in the absence of access to insurance,
householdsmeet their health expenses by reducing savings, borrowing, and selling assets. Informal insurance
arrangements and support from family and friends in the form of remittances are not a major source of
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support. Hence, itmay be expected that insurancewill work towards not only enhancing access to health care
and reducing out-of-pocket payments for medical services but will also allow households to reduce their
reliance on borrowing and avoid asset sales.9
The PSNP is expected to enhance food security by providing payments for labour contributions. It is also
expected to prevent households from borrowing and resorting to asset sales during times of crises. Thus,
simply due to the needs of the scheme, PSNP participants may be expected to provide more off-farm labour
as compared to non-participants. Furthermore, these labour contributions are important not only from the
perspective of households but also from the perspective of PSNPmanagers, as labour is needed to construct
public works. As discussed in Shigute et al. (2017), participation in the PSNP has a strong effect on CBHI
uptake. Despite the fact that the two schemes are not programmatically linked, the large effect of PSNP
participation on CBHI uptake may be attributed to the keen sense of the links between the two programmes
as perceived by local officials.
For instance, based on the qualitative information gathered through the key informant interviews, we
found that government officials have been taking measures to integrate different development interventions
such as agricultural extension, education, and health programmes. In particular, health extension workers
focus on PSNP beneficiaries and during PSNP-related meetings or while workers are taking a break from
their PSNP work, they provide information on personal hygiene and sanitation, child and maternal health
issues, and health insurance. They also encourage PSNPbeneficiaries to enrol. This approach is illustrated by
a statement made by a key informant in the Tigray region,
Continuous education on health issues including about the recently introduced community-based health
insurance scheme is provided to those people who are covered under PSNP. Moreover, during the
distribution of PSNP payments, the participants are asked if they would like to register for CBHI.
(Interviewed in December 2012)
More recently, in fieldwork conducted inMay 2017 in SNNPR district, key informants at theworeda and the
regional level argued that being a member of the CBHI delivers greater benefits for PSNP members since
they are food insecure and they cannot afford to cover unexpected expenses of health shocks.
Not only are PSNP participants encouraged to enrol but local officials expect enrolment to translate
into greater health care utilisation, quicker recovery from their illnesses, and influence the ability of
the PSNP participants to provide labour. During a discussion on the CBHI scheme a key informant in
Oromia region remarked,
We inform PSNP members to join the [CBHI] scheme because we want them to get immediate
treatment when they get sick. If they are not treated immediately, it affects their performance in
public works. These beneficiaries do development work and we don’t want them to fall sick so
the idea is if they buy insurance and get care then it may also improve their health outcomes.
(Interviewed in October 2014)
At the village level, the same government officials are responsible for implementing both the PSNP
and the CBHI and this clearly provides an incentive for officials to push both schemes. Furthermore,
from the perspective of PSNP beneficiaries, PSNP payments are dependent on labour contributions
and these payments are not available if there are work-absences due to sickness. In such circum-
stances, CBHI uptake is expected to encourage timely access to health care which in turn might
reduce illness-related losses in labour contributions and at the same time reduce payments lost due to
work-related absences. Thus, PSNP participants who are also CBHI members may be expected to
utilise greater health car, and provide more labour as compared to PSNP participants who are not
enrolled in the CBHI.
Indeed, the potential links between the two programmes are not restricted to officials and a FGD
participant in Oromia remarked,
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I can feed my family with the payment I get from PSNP public works and my kids can go to
school not worrying about whether and what they will eat. Because of my CBHI, I and my kids
can get proper treatment whenever we get sick. If it wasn’t for CBHI I might have to go around
my neighbourhood and ask for borrowing which is very difficult. (Discussed in September 2014)
Discussing her own situation, another individual in the discussion pointed out that,
I am the head of my household. Before I enrolled in the CBHI, I used to be absent from public
works for days when either myself or my kids get sick. I used to run into arguments during
payments justifying my long absence to the foreman. Going to the health centre was not easy for
my family. When they informed us about CBHI, I was the first one to enrol. Now, thanks to my
membership, I don’t get any more complaints for being absent as I immediately go to the health
centre when either I or my children get health problems and continue working on the public works.
I now tell my non-CBHI neighbours to enrol in the scheme. (Discussed in September 2014)
Similarly, a FGD participant in SNNPR articulated the links between the two schemes and stated that
the CBHI is a very useful intervention for food insecure households,
So far we used to get some money from PSNP in order to purchase food. Now we are getting
health services almost for free after joining CBHI. What shall I say simply I would like to thank
God. (Discussed in May 2017)
Overall, the CBHI on its own is expected to increase health care utilisation and to protect households from
resorting to borrowing and asset sales. The PSNP is expected to lead to an increase in off-farm labour and
through provision of payments in lieu of labour, it is expected to prevent food-insecure households from
borrowing and selling assets to meet their consumption needs. Given the partially overlapping aims of the
two interventions and the potential linkages between the PSNP and the CBHI we expect that those who
participate in both the programmes will use more health care, provide more off-farm labour, they should
also be less likely to take up a loan and to sell assets in order to cope with shocks.10
4.2. Empirical approach
Based on the preceding discussion, the empirical analysis focuses on examining the joint effects of
the two programmes on health care use, off-farm labour supply, livestock assets, and borrowing.11 To
identify the joint effects of the CBHI and PSNP we exploit individual-level panel data and estimate
several variants of a difference-in-difference (DiD) model. That is,
Yijt ¼ ðCBHI  PSNPÞijtβþ CBHIijtγþ PSNPijtδþ Xijtηþ Ttθ þ ðW  TÞjtσ þ λi þ εijt; (1)
where Yijt represents the outcome of interest for individual i residing in woreda j at time t, the interaction
term CBHI  PSNPð Þijt indicates participation in both the CBHI and the PSNP (both are binary variables),
whileCBHI and PSNP indicate participation in either of the two programmes, and Xijt is a vector of time-
varying observables.12 We include two sets of time effects, Tt represents a time fixed effect, W  Tð Þjt is
a woreda-specific time-effect, λi is an individual fixed effect, and εijt is a time-variant individual error
term.13 The main coefficient of interest is β, which indicates the additional effect of participating in both
the PSNP and the CBHI as compared to participating in only one of the two schemes.14
While it is straightforward to estimate Equation (1), there are a number of potential identifica-
tion concerns. As mentioned in Section 2, participation in the PSNP is not voluntary and
households cannot self-select themselves into the scheme. Beneficiaries are selected based on
community identification of their food-insecure status as well as an assessment of their assets and
employment status. While this does not preclude the possibility that unobserved factors such as
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local influence and social networks may influence beneficiary selection, unless such factors are
changing over time it is perhaps reasonable to argue that Equation (1), which controls for time-
varying socio-economic characteristics and individual fixed-effects, is likely to be able to deal
with endogeneity of PSNP participation. While initial selection into the PSNP may be less of
a concern, there is the possibility of reverse causality between PSNP status and household asset
position. That is, over the course of the three years, households may exit the PSNP as their asset
position improves, which in turn implies that there would be a tendency to underestimate the
effect of the PSNP. One option would be to drop such observations but this may not be
appropriate as graduating households may have been able to build up assets because of the
protective effects of both schemes. We adopt a conservative approach and retain such households
in the sample. At the same time, we do provide evidence that leaving such individuals out of the
sample leads to underestimation of the PSNP effect.15
A perhaps more challenging issue is the endogeneity of CBHI membership. As described in
Section 2, households choose whether to join the CBHI and it is possible that CBHI membership
is driven by unobserved characteristics that are systematically associated with the outcomes, and
thereby confound scheme effects. While Equation (1) includes individual fixed effects and controls
for time-varying socio-economic attributes, it is still possible that unobserved time-varying factors
such as changes in health status, which influence the outcomes of interest, also drive CBHI uptake.
Keeping in mind the potential selection issues, prior to discussing estimates of Equation (1), we
explore differences between CBHI participants and non-participants and also examine what drives
scheme uptake.
5. Results
5.1. PSNP and CBHI uptake
In 2011, before the launch of the CBHI, about 21 per cent of the sample respondents were enrolled in the
PSNP. The figure increased slightly in 2012 (22%) but fell to 18 per cent in 2013 (see Table 1). While the
aggregate PSNP enrolment figures do not exhibit much variation over time, this is misleading, as over the
three years it is not the same individuals who remain in the scheme. Some individuals graduate from the
scheme while others join the scheme.With regard to the CBHI, within a year of its launch, CBHI enrolment
reached 43 per cent and in 2013 rose to 51 per cent (Table 1). PSNP beneficiaries are far more likely to
participate in the CBHI scheme. For instance, in 2012 about 65 per cent of PSNP beneficiaries enrolled in
the scheme as compared to an enrolment rate of 38 per cent amongst non-beneficiaries while in 2013 the
corresponding figures were 72 and 46 per cent (Table 2). By 2013, 52 per cent of the sample was not
enrolled in either of the two schemes, 30 per cent were enrolled only in the CBHI, 9 per cent in both
schemes, and 8 per cent only in the PSNP (Table 3).
5.2. Who enrols in the PSNP and the CBHI?
Table 4 provides descriptive statistics conditional on programme status at baseline, that is, before the launch
of the CBHI.16 The figures show a clear hierarchy in terms of socio-economic status and programme
participation. For instance, 46 per cent of the individuals who are in both the programmes belong to the
poorest consumption quintile as compared to 20 per cent amongst those in no programme. Individuals
belonging only to the CBHI are at the top rung, followed by those who are not members of a programme,
PSNP members and finally those who participate in both schemes. This clear-cut pattern based on socio-
economic status is in sharp contrast to health status. Across the four categories, there are small differences in
the three health status variables. There is no evidence that individuals with poorer health status – either self-
assessed or based on the incidence of recent illness or the prevalence of chronic conditions – are more likely
to join the CBHI or both schemes.
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Multinomial logit estimates of the probability of being in the four categories (Table 5) yields
the same message. Individuals in the highest consumption quintile are about six percentage points
less likely to belong to both programmes and nine percentage points more likely to enrol in the
CBHI. Similarly, households with larger land endowments are four percentage points less likely to
belong to both programmes and six percentage points more likely to enrol in the CBHI. With
regard to health status, past illness has no bearing on programme status, the incidence of chronic
illness reduces the probability of being in both programmes by three percentage points and has no
bearing on determining entry into the CBHI. If anything, those with better self-assessed health
status are more likely to join both programmes and self-assessed health status does not influence
insurance uptake.
With regard to the outcomes, at baseline, consistent with the consumption data, those who
participate in both programmes have substantially lower livestock holdings and are far more
likely to be engaged in off-farm work (see Table 4). At baseline, their utilisation of health care
is also lower as compared to those who do not belong to both programmes or those who
eventually participate only in the CBHI.
Table 1. Participation in PSNP and CBHI
2011 2012 2013
Membership Membership Membership
Programme % N % N % N
PSNP 21.2 918 21.8 940 17.6 732
CBHI 0 0 43.2 1,445 50.6 1,640
Table 2. CBHI uptake and PSNP participation
2012 2013
Enrolled in the CBHI
PSNP
member Non-members Total
PSNP
member Non-member Total
Enrolled 410 (64.6) 1,035 (38.2) 1,445 (43.2) 380 (72.2) 1,260 (46.4) 1640 (50.6)
Total 635 2,707 3,342 526 2,715 3241
Notes: Observations are restricted to the districts where CBHI was offered.
Table 3. Participation in CBHI and PSNP – full sample
2011 2012 2013 Sample total
Membership Membership Membership Membership
Programme % N % N % N %
PSNP only 21.2 918 12.2 530 8.5 352 14.0 1,800
CBHI only – – 23.9 1,035 30.4 1,260 17.9 2,295
Both programmes – – 9.4 410 9.2 380 6.2 790
No programme 78.8 3,414 54.5 2,362 52.0 2,159 61.9 7,935
Total 4,332 4,337 4,151 12,820
Notes: Observations include districts where CBHI was not offered.
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The clear picture emerging from this section is that selection into the four different groups is strongly
linked to socio-economic status and not to health status. The empirical estimates presented in the next section
do control for a range of time-varying attributes, including socio-economic status and for individual fixed-
effects. Furthermore, the substantially lower socio-economic status and lower health care use, at baseline, for
Table 4. Descriptive statistics conditional on membership status
Total
Sample
CBHI*
PSNP CBHI PSNP
No
Programme p-value
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Outcome variables
Utilisation of modern health care (1/0) 0.10 0.07 0.11 0.09 0.10 0.04
Number of visits to modern health facilities 0.17 0.12 0.18 0.15 0.17 0.16
Off-farm worker (1/0) 0.13 0.29 0.1 0.31 0.09 0.00
Number of hours worked off-farm (in a month) 11.02 22.4 7.7 23.0 7.7 0.00
Value of Livestock (Birr) 19963.74 13031.1 29897.0 12815.6 17585.27 0.00
Loan uptake (1/0) 0.32 0.50 0.34 0.41 0.27 0.00
Amount of loan (Birr) 2186.23 2052.73 2340.87 2485.57 2040.97 0.94
Covariates
Socio-economic status
Poorest consumption quintile 0.23 0.46 0.17 0.28 0.20 0.00
2nd consumption quintile 0.21 0.25 0.18 0.27 0.21 0.04
3rd consumption quintile 0.19 0.13 0.21 0.16 0.20 0.00
4th consumption quintile 0.20 0.12 0.20 0.21 0.20 0.00
Richest consumption quintile 0.17 0.03 0.24 0.08 0.19 0.00
No education 0.39 0.40 0.34 0.43 0.41 0.98
Informal education 0.07 0.04 0.10 0.05 0.06 0.14
Primary education 0.42 0.42 0.44 0.43 0.41 0.96
Secondary education and above 0.12 0.14 0.12 0.09 0.12 0.33
Land cultivated 1.1 0.69 1.6 0.79 1.0 0.00
Experienced shock 0.88 0.83 0.83 0.88 0.91 0.00
Demographic characteristics
Age 32.3 32.6 32.1 32.5 32.2 0.59
Male 0.51 0.48 0.54 0.47 0.52 0.14
Household size 6.5 6.7 6.9 5.9 6.4 0.06
Religion- Orthodox 0.49 0.55 0.61 0.60 0.40 0.00
Religion- Protestant 0.21 0.28 0.17 0.12 0.25 0.14
Religion – Muslim 0.27 0.13 0.21 0.25 0.32 0.00
Religion- other religion or no religion 0.03 0.04 0.00 0.03 0.04 0.96
Health status
Self-assessed health-good 0.80 0.84 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.06
Self-assessed health-not good 0.20 0.16 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.06
Past illness event 1.8 1.5 1.9 1.8 1.8 0.31
Chronic illness for more than 30 days 0.06 0.03 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.02
Financial participation and networks
Savings in bank account 0.13 0.03 0.22 0.10 0.12 0.00
Member of Iqqub – informal rotating savings/
credit group
0.07 0.06 0.09 0.04 0.07 0.86
Member of a formal credit & saving
association
0.11 0.09 0.21 0.02 0.10 0.68
Official position held 0.25 0.13 0.38 0.19 0.23 0.00
Regions
Tigray 0.21 0.48 0.07 0.61 0.13 0.00
Amhara 0.26 0.07 0.39 0.17 0.26 0.00
Oromia 0.25 0.07 0.35 0.07 0.27 0.00
SNNPR 0.28 0.37 0.19 0.15 0.33 0.12
Observations (N) 4,259 390 1,011 512 2,346
Notes: CBHI and PSNP membership status in 2012 values. All other characteristics are based on the 2011
survey. P-value for comparison of means in columns 2 and 5.
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Table 5. Probability of participating in PSNP and CBHI- multinomial logit marginal effects estimates (std. error)
Variables
No
programme CBHI only PSNP only
Both
programmes
Socio-economic status
2nd Consumption Quintile (Ref: Poorest
Quintile)
0.058***
(0.018)
−0.024**
(0.010)
−0.012**
(0.005)
−0.022***
(0.006)
3rd Consumption Quintile 0.036*** 0.031*** −0.031*** −0.036***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.002) (0.002)
4th Consumption Quintile 0.030*** 0.023** −0.019*** −0.034***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.003) (0.005)
5th Consumption Quintile 0.020** 0.089*** −0.046*** −0.062***
(0.009) (0.008) (0.003) (0.004)
Informal Education (Ref: No Education) −0.057** 0.037** 0.014*** 0.006
(0.027) (0.017) (0.005) (0.013)
Primary Education −0.035*** 0.018 0.007 0.009
(0.009) (0.014) (0.008) (0.008)
Secondary & above Education −0.021 0.007 −0.003 0.017
(0.020) (0.023) (0.011) (0.012)
Land Cultivated −0.004 0.061*** −0.022*** −0.036***
(0.005) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003)
Experienced Shock 0.067*** −0.024** −0.005 −0.037***
(0.009) (0.012) (0.007) (0.003)
Demographic characteristics
Age −0.0004 −0.0002 −0.00001 0.0006
(0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0001) (0.0004)
Male 0.016 0.0007 −0.006 −0.011*
(0.014) (0.011) (0.006) (0.006)
Household Size −0.011*** 0.020*** −0.007*** −0.002***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.0007) (0.0008)
Religion-Orthodox (Ref. category:
Muslim)
0.010 0.198*** −0.170*** −0.038***
(0.010) (0.019) (0.018) (0.005)
Religion-Protestant −0.142*** 0.189*** −0.020** −0.027***
(0.031) (0.026) (0.008) (0.006)
Religion- Other religion or no religion 0.111** −0.119** 0.021 −0.013
(0.049) (0.050) (0.016) (0.013)
Health status
Self-assessed health – good (Reference not
good SAH)
−0.048*** 0.016 0.014*** 0.018***
(0.016) (0.013) (0.005) (0.002)
Past illness −0.002* 0.001 0.0003 0.0004
(0.001) (0.002) (0.0004) (0.0005)
Chronic illness 0.016 0.001 0.009 −0.026***
(0.024) (0.034) (0.012) (0.0032)
Financial participation and networks
Saving in bank account 0.002 0.049*** −0.006 −0.045***
(0.019) (0.010) (0.008) (0.005)
Member of Iqqub −0.009 −0.034** 0.031*** 0.012**
(0.018) (0.014) (0.005) (0.005)
Member of credit and saving association −0.053*** 0.024 −0.037*** 0.066***
(0.004) (0.017) (0.008) (0.011)
Official position held −0.049*** 0.063*** −0.006** −0.008***
(0.009) (0.012) (0.002) (0.003)
Observations 4,214 4,214 4,214 4,214
Pseudo R-squared 0.193 0.193 0.193 0.193
Log pseudo likelihood −3895.630 −3895.630 −3895.630 −3895.630
Notes: All explanatory variables are at their 2011 values; Standard errors in parentheses; ***p < 0.01;
**p < 0.05; *p < 0.1.
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those who belong to both programmes, suggests negative selection into this category and supports the idea
that, if at all, estimates of the effect of belonging to both social programmes are likely to be downward biased.
Table 6. Descriptive statistics by membership status – full sample
Variables
Total
Sample
(1)
CBHI*
PSNP
(2)
CBHI
(3)
PSNP
(4)
No
Programme
(5)
p-value
(6)
Outcome variables
Utilisation of modern health care (1/0) 0.09 0.11 0.11 0.08 0.09 0.06
Number of visits to modern health care facilities 0.14 0.14 0.19 0.13 0.13 0.62
Off-farm worker (1/0) 0.12 0.33 0.06 0.31 0.07 0.00
Number of hours worked off-farm (in a month) 11.50 30.0 6.6 25.69 7.8 0.00
Value of Livestock Assets (Birr) 19375.3 13560.6 27765.0 12703.6 19041.1 0.00
Loan uptake (1/0) 0.30 0.41 0.27 0.41 0.27 0.00
Amount of loan (Birr) 2499.16 2468.38 3314.12 2392.75 2307.13 0.19
Covariates
Socio-economic status
Poorest consumption quintile 0.22 0.35 0.16 0.30 0.21 0.00
2nd consumption quintile 0.22 0.25 0.17 0.26 0.21 0.01
3rd consumption quintile 0.20 0.19 0.21 0.18 0.20 0.37
4th consumption quintile 0.19 0.14 0.23 0.17 0.19 0.00
Richest consumption quintile 0.17 0.07 0.22 0.09 0.19 0.00
No education 0.38 0.36 0.32 0.43 0.39 0.09
Informal education 0.06 0.04 0.09 0.05 0.06 0.00
Primary education 0.43 0.45 0.44 0.41 0.43 0.15
Secondary education and above 0.13 0.15 0.16 0.11 0.12 0.02
Land cultivated 1.06 0.64 1.5 0.74 1.05 0.00
Experienced shock 0.77 0.59 0.74 0.76 0.79 0.00
Demographic characteristics
Age 32.6 32.7 32.8 33.1 32.5 0.71
Male 0.51 0.47 0.53 0.47 0.52 0.01
Household size 6.5 6.7 6.8 6.0 6.5 0.05
Religion- Orthodox 0.49 0.57 0.65 0.60 0.41 0.00
Religion- Protestant 0.22 0.27 0.15 0.15 0.25 0.15
Religion – Muslim 0.26 0.14 0.19 0.21 0.30 0.00
Religion- other religion or no religion 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.03
Health status
Self-assessed health – good 0.81 0.86 0.80 0.83 0.80 0.00
Self-assessed health – not good 0.19 0.14 0.20 0.17 0.20 0.00
Past illness event 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.4 0.80
Chronic illness for more than 30 days 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.51
Financial participation and networks
Savings in bank account 0.13 0.12 0.21 0.07 0.12 0.63
Member of Iqqub – informal rotating savings/
credit group
0.07 0.07 0.08 0.05 0.07 0.56
Member of a formal credit & saving association 0.11 0.10 0.16 0.06 0.11 0.78
Official position held 0.23 0.16 0.35 0.17 0.22 0.00
Regions
Tigray 0.21 0.49 0.13 0.60 0.12 0.00
Amhara 0.26 0.07 0.40 0.14 0.27 0.00
Oromia 0.24 0.07 0.29 0.07 0.28 0.00
SNNPR 0.29 0.37 0.18 0.19 0.33 0.05
Observations (N) 12,820 790 2,295 1,800 7,935
Notes: The p-value is for differences in means between columns 2 and 5.
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5.3. The joint effect of CBHI and PSNP
Estimates of the joint and individual effect of the two programmes on health care utilisation, labour supply,
livestock, and borrowings are presented in Table 7.17 We begin with a discussion of the effect of the two
schemes on health care utilisation. Participating in the CBHI increases the probability of using outpatient
health care by 2.3 percentage points. In contrast, PSNP membership on its own does not have a statistically
significant effect on health care use. However, the additional effect of belonging to both programmes is
a 4.6 percentage point increase in the use of health care. These effects imply that joint participation versus
only participating in the PSNP is associated with a 6.9 percentage point increase in health care utilisation
while there is no additional effect as compared to participating only in the CBHI. Joint membership also has
a positive effect on the frequency of using modern health care, although the effect is not precise. While the
estimates in Table 7 focus only on adults, we also estimated the effect of participation in the two schemes on
other household members, that is, young children (less than 15) and older adults (65 and above) and for the
full sample (see Table S4, and other Supplementary Materials). These estimates confirm the finding that
joint membership increases both the probability of using health care and the frequency of use. Thus, not only
does participating in the PSNP translate into greater enrolment in the CBHI (see Table 2), it also translates
into greater use of health care amongst those belonging to both programmes.
As discussed in Section 4, government officials use the PSNP as a platform to encourage greater
uptake of CBHI not only to fulfil enrolment targets but also to mitigate the effect of health-related
reasons for not providing PSNP labour contributions. If this is valid then participation in both
programmes may be expected to translate not only into greater health care use but also into greater
off-farm labour supply. As shown in Table 7, participating in the PSNP increases the probability of
providing off-farm work by 13 percentage points. Given the nature of the PSNP, which requires off-
farm work in order to obtain benefits, this may be expected. In contrast, on its own CBHI member-
ship has no effect on labour supply. However, the additional effect of participating in both pro-
grammes is positive and statistically significant (seven percentage points).
The large, positive, and statistically significant effect of joint membership is also evident in terms of hours
of off-farm labour supply. An individual participating only in the PSNP provides an additional six hours of
work as compared to those who do not participate in any programme while individuals belonging to both
programmes provide 11 more hours per month to off-farm activities. Thus, participating in both schemes
translates into 17more hours of work permonth as compared to participating only in the PSNP. The increase
in health care use and the increase in off-farm labour supply is consistent with the claim of government
officials and the view of participants who are members of both programmes (see Section 4) that the CBHI
helps individuals access health care in a timely manner and may reduce health-related absenteeism in public
work activities of the PSNP.
On their own, the two social programmes do not have an impact on the value of livestock assets
(see Table 7). This is consistent with the findings on the effect of the CBHI on livestock assets as
reported in Yilma et al. (2015) and also the effect of the PSNP on livestock assets as reported in
Andersson et al. (2011).18 In contrast, belonging to both programmes is associated with a 717 Birr
increase in the value of livestock or a modest increase of about 4 per cent as compared to those who
don’t belong to either of the two programmes.
With regard to the incidence of borrowing, the effect emanates almost entirely from CBHI
membership. PSNP on its own does not influence the probability of borrowing and the joint effect
is zero. In contrast, conditional on borrowing, while CBHI membership encourages greater borrow-
ing, membership of both programmes works towards reducing the debt burden of households.
Belonging to both programmes is associated with a 616 Birr or 28 per cent reduction in debt.19
Overall, for almost all the outcomes, the interaction term is statistically significant and large, implying
that the joint effect of the two programmes is larger than the sum of the individual effects. These estimates
suggest that the PSNP and the CBHI may be used as complementary instruments for enhancing health
care utilisation, off-farm labour supply, protecting household assets, and reducing indebtedness.
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5.4. Robustness checks
As has been shown in Table 4, at baseline, there are clear differences in the socio-economic status of those
who are enrolled in both schemes versus those who are not enrolled in either scheme or enrolled only in
the CBHI. While our estimates do control for individual fixed-effects and time-varying traits, it is still
possible that pre-existing unobservable differences at baseline may influence the trajectory of the
outcome variables in subsequent years and contaminate the effects of the CBHI and the PSNP. This
section reports on three robustness checks carried out to probe the sensitivity of the estimates.
First, we restricted the sample only to those who participate in the PSNP. As shown in Table 4, at
baseline, those who participate only in the PSNP have similar characteristics as compared to those
who participate in both programmes.20 While not as crisp as those reported in Table 7, estimates
conditioning on PSNP status (see Table S4) reveal a similar pattern. That is, PSNP participants who
are enrolled in the CBHI are four percentage points more likely to use health care and 10 percentage
points more likely to engage in off-farm labour. Their labour contribution in terms of hours of work is
31 per cent higher than their non-CBHI enrolled counterparts. While there is no effect on livestock
assets, their participation in the CBHI is associated with an 18 per cent reduction in borrowing.
Second, we estimated the probability of enrolling in the CBHI as a function of characteristics at
baseline and obtained estimates of the probability of enrolling in the programme. Subsequently, we
restricted the PSNP sub-sample to observations on common support and estimated a propensity-score
weighted specification of Equation (1). As shown in Table S6, estimates based on the reweighted sub-
sample are very similar to those reported in Table S5.
Finally, the CBHI scheme is meant to enhance access to health care only from public health centres
and hospitals as opposed to publicly provided health posts (which provide free access) and privately run
health centres. If we are picking up spurious effects then it is possible that joint participation in the
CBHI and PSNP will also have an effect on health care utilisation from health posts and from privately
run clinics. Estimates provided in Table S7 show that this is not the case. The effects we identify
emanate entirely from an increase in health care utilisation from publicly financed health services and
specifically from publicly run health centres as opposed to health posts and private clinics.
6. Discussion and concluding remarks
In developing countries and in particular in sub-Saharan Africa, social protection schemes tend to
operate in silos. However, the mutually reinforcing negative effects of the different types of risks,
especially those confronting rural households in developing countries, suggests that effective social
protection may require multiple coordinated interventions. So far, the empirical literature on the joint
effects of social protection schemes is limited. However, schemes targeting the same geographical
areas of a country offer an opportunity to identify the potential of linking social protection schemes.
This paper exploited the geographical overlap of the Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP) and the
Community Based Health Insurance (CBHI), two large social protection interventions in Ethiopia, to
examine their joint effect on health care utilisation, off-farm labour supply, livestock assets, and outstanding
loans. The analysis was based on three rounds of panel data and informed by several rounds of qualitative
interviews. We exploited the panel data, baseline, and two follow-up surveys and controlled for individual
and time fixed-effects as well as a range of time-varying traits to provide arguably credible estimates.
Despite the fact that the two social protection schemes are not formally linked, the qualitative inter-
views revealed that village-level officials were aware of the potential complementarities between the
PSNP and the CBHI. Consistent with the expectations and actions of these officials, we found that
participating in both programmes yields substantial additional benefits. Specifically, individuals who
participate in both programmes, as opposed to neither, were five percentage points more likely to use
outpatient care and 21 percentage points more likely to participate in off-farm work. Participation in both
programmes was associated with a 4 per cent increase in livestock and a 28 per cent decline in debt.
Except for the effect on livestock, the estimates were not sensitive to a number of robustness checks.
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Despite this, given the targeted nature of the PSNP and voluntary enrolment into the CBHI we do not
claim that these are causal effects, but estimates that are robust to a variety of confounding factors.
Our results demonstrate that, at least in Ethiopia, not onlymay participation in a public works programme
be used to leverage greater uptake of health insurance, but that the existing village-level co-ordination of the
two social protection interventions generates synergies and does provide greater protection to vulnerable
households. The results of this paper support the idea that systematic linking of social protection schemes
currently operating in Ethiopia, as envisaged among others by UNICEF (2016), are likely to generate
positive effects. Indeed, unlike Winston Smith in Orwell’s 1984 who worries whether a strong state will
assert that ‘two plus two equals five’, in the current case the combination of the two programmes delivers
more than the sum of the individual effects.
Notes
1. Soares, Knowles, Daidone, and Tirivayi (2016) provide a 37-study review of the combined effects of agricultural and
social protection interventions. Of the studies included, nine are from Africa of which four are on Ethiopia.
2. A related body of literature examines the bundling of health insurance with microfinance loans (Banerjee, Duflo, &
Hornbeck, 2014; Hamid, Roberts, & Mosley, 2011). Evidence on the effectiveness of such an approach is mixed.
3. We focus on livestock as a measure of wealth. According to Dercon (2004), in rural Ethiopia, livestock is the most
important marketable asset and accounts for a large proportion (90%) of the value of household assets.
4. The latter component accounts for 70 to 85 per cent of the total beneficiaries (six million individuals) and budget
(MoARD, 2010, 2011). The programme operates in 319 food insecure districts (40% of the total districts) in eight regions
of the country (FDRE, 2012; MoARD, 2011). In 2013–2014, the programme had a cash budget of $205 million and access
to 274,844 metric tons of food.
5. FMoH (2010) estimates that local and international donors finance about 40 per cent of health care, out-of-pocket (OOP)
expenditure accounts for about 37 per cent, central and local governments cover about 21 per cent, while employer and
private insurance schemes cover the remainder.
6. Support from social networks is limited and households do not appear to resort to increasing labour supply or reducing
consumption.
7. The pilot CBHI was offered to about 300,000 households.
8. The year-specific number of observations is 4,332 individuals in 2011; 4,337 in 2012; and 4,151 in 2013 (Table 3).
9. Yilma et al. (2015) show that participation in the CBHI leads to a reduction in borrowing while there are no effects on
asset holdings. Whether participation in both the CBHI and the PSNP enhances these effects is the subject of this paper.
10. While the channels through which the PSNP and CBHI are expected to influence borrowing and assets are self-evident, the
expected effects of the CBHI on labour supply are perhaps not as straightforward. Our expectation buttressed by the qualitative
interviews is that the CBHI increases timely use of health care use and consequently reduces the incidence or duration of
illnesses and thereby increases labour supply. Unfortunately, we do not have sufficiently accurate information on the sickness
history of individuals to demonstrate that access to health care has prevented illnesses or reduced illness durations.
11. Essentially, we look at four different outcomes. However, for some of the outcomes we have measures of incidence and intensity.
12. The time varying variables include demographic characteristics (age, household size), socio-economic status (consumption
quintile, education, land cultivated), experience of any shock in the 12 months preceding the survey, and variables capturing
financial participation and networks. We also estimated specifications that excluded consumption and included three time varying
health status variables. The estimates are robust to the inclusion/exclusion of these variables.
13. The sample is divided into three sets of woredas – see Table A1. We allow woreda-specific time effects for each of these
three types of woredas.
14. The specification used to identify the joint effect differs from Pace et al. (2017). In their specification, the sample is divided into
four mutually exclusive groups and their variable indicating joint participation takes on a value 1 and 0 otherwise and is not an
interaction term. In our case, we use an interaction term. Regardless of the specification used, the results are not different.
15. The data supports this idea and shows that those who move out of the PSNP have a higher asset position. For instance,
those who were in the PSNP in 2011 and remained in 2013, had mean livestock assets of Birr 12,276 while those who left
in 2013 had livestock assets of Birr 17,919. Similarly, those who were in the PSNP in 2012 and remained in 2013 had
livestock assets worth Birr 12,489 while those who left in 2013 had assets worth Birr 17,731. The differences are
statistically significant. We also find that those who left the PSNP and are CBHI members, tend to have livestock assets of
higher value, as compared to those who graduated from the PSNP but are not CBHI members (Table S1).
16. Table 6 provides descriptive statistics conditional on programme status for the full sample.
17. For detailed estimates see Tables S2 and S3.
18. In contrast to Andersson et al. (2011), Berhane, Hoddinott, Kumar, and Taffesse (2011) find that five years of participation
in the public works programmes raises livestock holdings by 0.38 tropical livestock units relative to those who have
participated for only one year. The effect is statistically significant.
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19. We also estimated household level regressions of livestock andborrowing (TableS8). The effect of jointmembership on livestock is
positive but statistically insignificant while the effect on the amount of borrowing remains in the same range as reported earlier.
20. A joint test for differences in means of the six outcome variables (excluding loan amount as the number of observations differs)
yields a p-value of 0.374. Individually, none of the outcome variables are statistically different at least at the 5 per cent level.
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Appendix
Table A1. District level intersection of CBHI and PSNP
Region
Amhara Oromia SNNPR Tigray
PSNP = 1 Tehuledere Deder Dale Kelite Awlalo
CBHI = 1 Kuyu Denboya Ahferon
Damot Woyde Tahitay Adiabo
PSNP = 1
CBHI = 0 Qallu Kersa Awasa Zurya Saesy Tseadamba
PSNP = 0 Fogera Gimbichu – –
CBHI = 1
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